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Executive Summary  
The present paper addresses the question of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in Sweden and 
portrays the ways in which the aforementioned types of diversity have been dealt with so far in this 
Northern European country. In doing so, the report primarily delineates the main constitutive 
elements of the Swedish national identity (i.e. “who is considered to be Swedish”) as well as the some 
of the most important factors and historical conditions that have shaped the modern Swedish state. By 
explicating the formation of modern Swedish state as well as the most common features of Swedish 
national identity, we also provide a basis for an understanding of the demarcations and limitations of 
Swedish citizenship.  
In the introductory part of the paper, we describe some key features of Sweden, migration to Sweden, 
Swedish official policy on recognition and tolerance, and some of the challenges of cultural diversity 
that Sweden has faced   during recent years. In its second part, the paper focuses on the formation of 
the Swedish state, and the development of a modern (or, rather, late-modern) Swedish national 
identity, and its constituents. Although the developments during modernity and late modernity are 
emphasized, some room  is left for earlier historical course of events. The Swedish state was formed 
rather early, in the 11
th
 century, but remained a rather loosely organises formation until the 16
th
 
century, when the state was consolidated. During the wars in the 17
th
 century, a highly centralized 
state was developed, showing a relatively early example of a  rigorously organized state power. Since 
then, centralization has been one of the defining features in the execution of official power, 
increasingly shaping the relation between the state and the citizens . Later on, this specific tradition of 
centralization has also shaped the ways in which multicultural policies have been articulated and – 
above all - executed in Sweden. 
In Sweden, the ideological heritage from romantic, idealistic nationalism, which flourished during the 
19
th
 century, has – as in most other European countries – shaped the prevalent different conceptions 
of a national identity. Still, some local particularities may also be noted. From the establishment of the 
centralized Swedish state and until the 19
th
 century a ”nationalism” with a sharp focus upon religion 
dominated the public discourse, a nationalism which allowed for a rather generous form of cultural 
diversity as long as the people expressed their belonging to the Lutheran church. Later on, the 
discourse on national identity was under heavy influence from racist and "scientific” (i.e. 
predominantly medical) discourses. Thus, during the end of 19
th
 and until the middle of the 20
th
 
century a racial and Social Darwinist form of nationalism dominated the public discourse and the 
state policies.  
During the decades following the end of the Second World War, a Swedish national identity was 
developed, which was articulated in tandem with the ideological underpinnings of the Scandinavian 
welfare state model – and the relative success this model had shown in comparison to several other 
European countries. Swedes developed an understanding of themselves as a progressive and a modern 
group of citizens. According to their political inclination, people emphasized either economical and 
technological improvement or engineering skills as key features of the Swedish society and/or the 
success of the welfare state and the progressive, democratic and humanistic values that accompanied 
that political project. Following certain demographical changes (above all, an increased 
immigration), the decline of the Scandinavian model of the welfare state, and the relative success of 
neoliberal political models, the discursive prerequisites for the articulation of a national identity has 
changed. It could be said that present-day constituents of the Swedish identity on the one hand are 
shaped in line with the above-mentioned propensity to regard Swedishness as progressive, modern 
and democratic, and on the other directly worked out in relation to - and dissociation from - the 
migrant population and non-European ethnic groups. 
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In the third section of the paper, which is named “Main cultural challenges”, we outline the above 
mentioned change of prerequisites for the articulation of a Swedish identity. First, we depict the 
history of migration to Sweden since the Second World War, and then we provide a short survey of the 
minority groups which are living in Sweden. We also provide a short description of some ethnic or 
religious minority groups, which have encountered an explicit  and even extensive opposition to their 
claims for recognition or tolerance of their group-specific practices. In line with the opposition that 
their claims have met, it could be argued that they exemplify what is perceived as a cultural challenge.  
The modern era of immigration to Sweden can roughly be divided into four stages, each stage 
representing different types of immigrants and immigration: 1) refugees from neighboring countries, 
2) labor immigration from Finland and southern Europe, 3) family reunification and refugees from 
developing countries, and 4) asylum seekers from southeastern and Eastern Europe, and the Middle 
east, and the free movement of EU citizens within the European Union. With the reception of 
migrations, Sweden’s demographical structure has changed in a manifest way, and over 10 % of the 
population is born outside Sweden or has parents who are born outside Sweden. Still, with the 
exception of Finns, most migrant groups have been relatively small in number throughout history.  
The diversity of national minorities and the indigenous population the Saamis has been recognized 
through Sweden´s decision to ratify the Council of Europe´s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Still, this 
special recognition of the national minorities constitutes a break with earlier political traditions. 
Sweden’s official multicultural policy earlier had a more integrated or uniform stance towards 
national minorities and immigrant communities. Since the middle of the 1970s has Sweden officially 
adopted multiculturalism as a guiding policy with respect to immigrants and national minorities (even 
though the official rhetoric of multiculturalism has been downgraded in later years). The needs and 
the interests the national minorities were more recognized in the light of the political attention 
directed towards immigrants. The basis for the policy was summarized through the concept “equality, 
freedom of choice, and cooperation”. In the Swedish Instrument of Government it is also emphasized 
that various groups defined through language, ethnicity and religion should be supported in order to 
maintain their cultural heritage and identities. Following recently conducted research; we claim that 
four minority groups in Sweden face particular opposition in their claims for tolerance and/or respect: 
Saami, Roma, Muslims and Sub-Saharan Africans.  
In the fourth section of the report, it is outlined how questions of tolerance, acceptance and 
recognition has been articulated and formulated in migration- and minority policy during the last 
decades, with a specific emphasis upon  the ten previous years. The multicultural policy that was 
officially adopted in 1975 was characterized by an endeavor for recognition of minority rights, but it 
could be defined as an extrapolation of the Swedish welfare model; the goals of equality was enlarged 
with the goal of “freedom of choice”, by assuring the members of ethnic and linguistic minorities a 
genuine choice between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish 
cultural identity. Still, the policy was also influenced by a liberal, individualistic political philosophy, 
with its focus on individuals and individual rights and skepticism towards group-orientated rights, 
such as collective self-determination, land-rights and cultural autonomy. And - less than a decade 
after its implementation, an official discourse was articulated which stressed the limits of 
multiculturalism. The multicultural policy was circumscribed by a perceived need to clarify what was 
inherently Swedish culture, and a need to clarify which norms and values that are obligatory and 
unconditional in the Swedish society - and mandatory for migrants to conform to. Thus, we argue that 
a far-reaching program of tolerance and recognition was never fully implemented in Sweden in spite 
of the wide spread rhetoric of diversity and multiculturalism.  
A distinctive shift in Swedish multiculturalism policy took place in the mid-1990’s. The issue of 
inclusion of migrants into society was by and large transformed to a matter of inclusion of migrants 
into the labour market, and integrations policy consisted mainly of measures promoting employability 
– although the legal rights of the minorities were left unchanged. From the vantage point of labour 
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market conditions, the new policy puts its emphasis on the responsibilities and rights of the individual 
- not his or her affiliations. From now on, the political rhetoric in Sweden´s integration and minority 
politics focused more on “same rights and responsibilities” and “same possibilities”. Hence, the ideal 
of recognition was downgraded and the emphasis was placed upon notions such as same formal rights 
and responsibilities and non-discrimination – especially in the labour market. 
Lastly, it must be noted that a significant gulf between theory and practice haunts the political 
philosophy of multiculturalism – in Sweden as well as elsewhere. Partly counter to the relativist and 
pluralist core of the multiculturalism and the diversity oratory, practitioners of the welfare state 
repeatedly express a plea for conformity to perceived Swedish norms and standards. In official bodies 
we find an attitude of non-tolerance vis-à-vis those norms and customs of minority groups that are 
perceived to be not in tune with the basic norms of the majority culture.  
Keywords 
Sweden, recognition, tolerance, multiculturalism, policy, welfare state, citizenship, Saami, Roma, 
Muslims, Sub-Saharan Africans.  
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1. Introduction 
Geographically, Sweden is located on the Scandinavian Peninsula in north-western Europe, bordering 
on Finland and Norway; also, it has maritime borders with Denmark, Germany, Poland, Russia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and is linked to Denmark in the southwest by the Öresund Bridge. The 
size of the country is 450.000 sq km and the current population is 9,26 million  
 
Sweden has been described as one of the oldest nation states in Europe even though the country has 
had several multicultural elements, in terms of both cultural contacts (especially with Netherlands, 
Germany and England) and a diverse population structure with linguistic and ethnic pluralism –not at 
least through the presence of national minorities.  A political tradition from 16
th
 century with a 
centralized state in the foreground has also been a salient feature as well as a religious homogeneity in 
terms of the Lutheran church (a state church until the year of 2000). The historical facts concerning the 
character of the nation state could be seen as contributory causes to the prevalence of a so-called 
assimilationist model throughout history. 
 
The aim of this report is to describe and analyze some of the more salient challenges that Sweden 
faces with regard to cultural diversity during the last 30 years. Cultural diversity is here understood as 
a societal fact, i.e. that Sweden as a country consists of citizens/inhabitants with different cultural 
backgrounds. This form of diversity has often been assumed to present political and ethical challenges 
to the society and the state, and with respect to the more regional and local spheres of society.   
 
Even though large-scale migration to Sweden is a post world war II-phenomenon, Sweden has been 
characterized by cultural encounters between native inhabitants and so-called newcomers for many 
generations. In addition, cultural encounters between the majority population, national minorities and 
the indigenous population the Saami people show that the history of Sweden could be seen as 
multicultural in several ways. This report gives a presentation of this history. It also attempts to show 
how the multicultural history of Sweden reflects itself in the current situation and political debate.  
 
Since the middle of the 1970s has Sweden officially adopted multiculturalism as a guiding policy with 
respect to immigrants and national minorities (even though immigrant groups were in focus when the 
policy was formulated). It is striking that the needs and the interests of so-called internal minorities 
such as the national minorities were more recognized in the light of the political attention directed 
towards immigrants, for example, with respect to language rights. The basis for the policy was 
summarized through the concept “equality, freedom of choice, and cooperation” which was used in the 
guidelines adopted by Parliament in 1975. In the Swedish Instrument of Government 
(Regeringsformen = “the constitution”) from 1974 it is also emphasized that various groups defined 
through language, ethnicity and religion should be supported in order to maintain their cultural 
heritage and identities. However, these multicultural guidelines were formulated more or less on the 
basis of the assumption that the main cultural diversity could be exemplified through the so-called 
man-power or labour immigration that increased during the 1950s and the 1960s. This immigration 
came mainly from the Mediterranean countries and Central Europe. One of the largest groups was also 
the Finnish migrants(a group that have migrated to Sweden for many centuries - not at least because of 
the fact the territories that are now Finnish belonged to Sweden until 1809) Language as a cultural 
identity marker became more salient than, for example, markers based upon religion (which was more 
important as an identity marker in previous centuries and defined the boundaries for citizenship) - and 
- the government focused upon special rights to “home language instruction”.  
 
During the 1970s and the 1980s the migration pattern changed in a radical way. Sweden more or less 
closed the door for labour migration in the beginning of the 1970s and the following decades were 
characterized by immigration mainly through family reunification and refugee immigration. In the 
latter case the sending countries also changed in a striking way in comparison to the previous decades 
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of so-called man power immigration. Now the indeterminacy (and/or the tacit assumptions concerning 
cultural diversity) in the official guidelines became more or more obvious in political and academic 
circles. In different governmental reports the question of what should be seen as essential common 
values in a multicultural society set the tone for the discussions (Roth 1999). Hence, questions 
concerning the limits of pluralism grew in political importance. The official answers to these questions 
were often based upon references to Swedish criminal law and the declarations and conventions on 
human rights that Sweden at the time has signed and ratified.  
 
One could say that one central challenge regarding cultural diversity in the last three decades has been 
the gap between theory and practice in the multicultural policies. This phenomenon also applies to 
Sweden´s official endorsement (ratification) of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
Here the gap could be seen as practical in the sense that the authorities have not been engaged in any 
substantial measures in, for example, the field of education. Critics of the official guidelines both in 
political and academic circles have been eager to emphasize that the traditional assimilation model, 
which characterized Swedish policy for several decades in the post war period is – on the whole - far 
from dead, and that the cultural diversity which has been endorsed officially has been rather limited in 
nature. In addition to this “cultural discrimination” Sweden has also, according to some analysts, 
problems of discrimination both with respect to the labour market and with respect to the provision of 
various important goods and services such as housing and educational opportunities. These problems 
have often gone hand in hand. For example, the Romani people have faced both cultural and economic 
discrimination. In the case of the organized members of the indigenous population - the Saamis - one 
of their central cultural traits (“the reindeer enterprise”) also coincides with their main economic 
activity.  
 
However, the demand of special land rights (in the sense of article 169 in the ILO convention) has not 
been seen favourably by the Swedish government who have had a long tradition of scepticism towards 
notions such as cultural autonomy and self-determination. Various immigrant groups from non-
European countries have also members who are Muslims. These migrants have been exposed to 
discrimination and harassments with respect to their religion – and – they have, according to some 
researchers , also faced discrimination in the labour market on the basis of prejudice – either in terms 
of untenable generalizations concerning their working skills – or – in terms of assumptions concerning 
values and life styles where some of the these values have been seen as problematic and incompatible 
with the norms of the host society such as gender equity and the basic rights of the children. This latter 
argumentation was heavily used by the populist and anti-immigration party Sverigedemokraterna in 
the latest election 2010. Criticism towards the introduction of Sharia law in family matters has also 
been raised in various political circles (cf. Bauhn & Demirbag-Stéen 2010). However, this kind of 
proposal has not at all been raised extensively among the various Muslim groups in Sweden (Gardell 
2010).  
 
In the next section, the second, follows a very short description of Sweden’s formation as a state, as 
well as an account of the main tenets in Swedish nationalism, and how Swedish national identity is 
constructed today. The third section, “Main cultural challenges”, contains a description of Sweden’s 
modern immigration history, from the World War II and onwards, with a focus on the two last 
decades, and how the migrant legislation has changed during that period. Under this heading we also 
give a short account of four minority groups in present day Sweden; Saami, Roma, Muslims and sub-
Saharan Africans, whose claims for acceptance, tolerance and recognition sometimes is met with 
indecision, opposition or – at least at the informal level of everyday life – with outright aversion. In 
the section preceding the conclusions, we discuss how questions of tolerance, acceptance and 
recognition has been articulated and formulated in migration- and minority policy during the last 
decades, with a focus on the ten previous years.  
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2. National identity and state formation 
Commonly it is held that the formation of the Swedish state can be dated to the turn of the first 
millenium (1000 AD), although the center of the state most ceratinly had a quite limited command of 
its peripheries for the next couple of centuries. During the 12th century, Sweden was consolidated, and 
also conquered Finland, which remained a part of Sweden for the next six centuries. During the last 
two decades of the middle ages, Sweden fought recurrent wars war with the Danes, and during the 
15th century the country was forced into a union with Denmark and Norway, in the main under Danish 
sovereignity. Economically and culturally, Sweden was under extensive German influence during the 
late Middle ages, including immigration of missionaries, knights, merchants and craftsmen. The 
German Hanseatic League also brought Sweden into a wider economic circle as the Swedish economy 
became part of the larger northern and Western European economy (Runblom 1996, Roth 2004).  
 
Sweden gained independence from Denmark in the 16
th
 century, during the reign of Gustav Vasa and 
his successors, and the Swedish nation state was considerably consolidated. During the 17
th
 century, 
after winning wars against Denmark, Russia, and Poland, Sweden-Finland, emerged as a great power 
by taking direct control of the Baltic region. Still, with a population of scarcely more than 1 million 
inhabitants, the recurrent wars called for a rigorously organized state power, which could manage the 
large-scale recruitment of soldiers to the army. Thus, Sweden witnessed a centralization of power and 
a thoroughly effected bureaucratization as early as in the 17
th
 century, and since then centralization has 
been one of the constituents in the execution of official power. (Later on, this specific tradition of 
centralization has also shaped the ways in which multicultural policies have been articulated and – 
above all - executed in Sweden; see below.)  
 
In the period of consolidation of Swedish political power at the beginning of the early modern era, 
policies were characterized by pragmatism and a rather open attitude towards immigrants. Foreign 
ideas and groups were welcomed if they could contribute to state consolidation and development. In 
this period, many leading merchants, artisans and soldiers were of foreign origin. However, 
immigrants during the so-called great power era (especially during the 17th century) came in relatively 
small groups. In most cases the members were linguistically and religiously assimilated after a few 
generations and were integrated through marriage, residence, education and profession. This applied to 
the Germans in Stockholm, but also to Scots and the Dutch in Gothenburg who came in smaller 
numbers even though they also contributed to an important extent to the city life both in terms of 
culture and trade (Runblom 1995).  
 
In some cases the assimilation policy was clear and strictly organised. Inhabitants in the conquered 
Danish areas, such as Skåne (Scania) in the south of Sweden, were subjected to a systematic 
assimilation policy during the second half of the seventeenth century – for example – through the 
establishment of a new university. Other groups, however, were treated in a more tolerant fashion. 
French speaking Walloons (with special skills concerning the production of iron) and Finnish speaking 
Finns engaged in burn- beating agriculture, to some extent enjoyed special status since they managed 
to maintain their cultural characteristics such as language for some generations (Svanberg & Tydén 
1999). 
 
During the heyday of the Swedish empire, several ethnic groups inhabited its territory; not only 
Swedes, but Finns, Estonians, Germans, Saami, Romas, Russians and others. With the loss of the 
Baltic and German provinces during the second decade of the 18
th
 century, the territory of the Swedish 
state gradually came take the shape of what today is considered to be Sweden, a process which was 
finished in the first years of the 19
th
 century, when Finland was lost to the Russian empire. After the 
loss of Finland in 1809, the state authorities concentrated on building up Sweden as a national state 
and demarcating it from the outside world.  
 
In general, the 19th century is often called the century of nationalism; romantic nationalism with its 
credo ”one people, one nation, one station” took root throughout Europe, and in Sweden this meant 
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greatly limited immigration during certain periods, and a highly introverted approach to the national 
identity and belonging, even though Scandinavianism and a growing Nordicism characterised certain  
intellectual and political circles, and there also was a considerable import of foreign ideas in 
connection with early industrialisation. Scandinavianism was an ideology that tried to find common 
denominators between Norway, Sweden and Denmark through references to old Nordic myths and 
tradition – especially among students. However, in practice it proved to be politically weak. For 
example, during the three years war (1848- 1850) Sweden did not provide any practical help to 
Denmark. 
 
The loss of Finland had a negative impact on multicultural relations more generally. Arctic 
Scandinavia, which had previously been characterised by intense trading between the Saami, the 
Finnish-speaking population, Norwegians and Russians increasingly declined as a multicultural 
meeting place, now that there was a sharp focus on the geographical frontier with Finland, which had 
become a Grand Duchy of Russia. Furthermore, parts of northern Sweden became an extended area of 
colonisation, where the interests of the majority Swedes clashed with those of the Saami over hunting 
and fishing rights. The growing industrialization of Sweden in the late 19th century also meant that the 
Saamis and their culture were perceived as more and more irrelevant and obsolete with reference to 
the development of society (Ingvaldsen, Larsson & Pedersen 2009).  
 
Although the nineteenth-century nation was assiduous in drawing up boundaries – geographical, 
ethnic and cultural – the frontiers with the outside world remained open in significant respects. For 
example, a passport was since 1860 not required for inland domestic travels From the middle of the 
nineteenth century Sweden was also characterised by emigration, first and foremost to the U.S.A. In 
general, the causes behind the migration processes were mostly the widespread poverty, but also – at 
least during the first decades of migration – the lack of religious freedom and an authoritarian social 
climate with limited freedoms and democracy. Even though some of these migrants chose to return to 
Sweden after some years in the new country this migration meant a significant loss in terms of 
population which created a rather open attitude towards newcomers. Sweden´s borders remained more 
or less open until World War I, when a strict law of deportation was introduced.  
 
Thus, one could trace various forms of nationalism in the history of Sweden. From the period of the 
establishment of the centralized Swedish and until the 19th century a ”nationalism” with a sharp focus 
upon religion dominated the public discourse, a nationalism which allowed for a rather generous form 
of cultural diversity as long as the people expressed their belonging to the Lutheran church. During the 
end of 19th and until the middle of the 20th century a racial form of nationalism dominated the public 
discourse and state policies, a nationalism that was heavily influenced by Social Darwinism and racial 
biology.
1
 This nationalism or ideology also expressed itself through the sterilization laws that were 
introduced during the 1930s, laws that actually were in play until the middle of 1970. These laws 
meant that people who were seen as “unfit” for ordinary social life were forced to be sterilized. This 
targeted group was quite diverse and it included Roma people, mentally disabled and single mothers; 
cf. Svanberg & Tydén 1999).  
 
After the second world war the official form of nationalism and social belonging changed to more 
cultural forms of nationalism that were seen as more acceptable in the light of world politics. A 
common hypothesis among scholars is that the post war period of Sweden has been dominated by a 
rather thick cultural-ethnic nationalism in spite of an official multicultural ideology – especially during 
                                                     
1
 Racial biology also inluenced Sweden´s official immigration and minority policies during this period. According to those 
policies. certain ethnic groups, such as the European Jews were identified as ”undesirable”. By the end of the 1930s the 
door was almost completely closed to Jewish refugees. Jews were not seen as political refugees who meant that their 
chances of entering Sweden were minimal during the years 1938-1940. However, after 1943 Sweden changed its attitude 
and over 6.000 Danish Jews were granted a safe haven after their escape from Denmark, a change in mentality that was 
caused by several motives – among them - mercy and realpolitik. (Runblom 1995)  
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the two last decades of the 20th century (Svanberg & Tydén 1999, Roth 1996). In this national 
narrative the concept of the welfare state and its assumed Swedish expression (“folkhemmet”) has 
played an important role – especially for many of the supporters of the Swedish labour party – 
Socialdemokraterna. Still, the fact that the Swedish society has become a receiver of migration has 
changed it in a number of ways. To a certain extent, it has also changed the ways in which Swedes 
perceive themselves and others.  
 
Nevertheless, the alterations in Swedish national identity which has occurred during the last three 
decades cannot only – or even primarily – be explained with the reference to the increased presence of 
other ethnicities. For example, numerous scholars (cf. Löfgren 1987, Daun 1996) have pointed to the 
fact that notions of modernity, progression and general welfare during the post-world war II period by 
the Swedes themselves was associated with Swedishness. In tandem with the political and economical 
development in Sweden during the decades after the war, Swedes developed an understanding of 
themselves as a progressive and modern group of citizens. Following your political inclination, one 
could emphasize either economical and technological improvement and engineering skills, or the 
success of the welfare state and the progressive, democratic and humanistic values that accompanied 
that political project. During the high modernity of Western Europe, Sweden was by many – 
particularly by the Swedes themselves – perceived as one of the most modern countries in the world, 
and Swedes as one of its most modern populations.  
 
The new membership in EU 1995 meant that two cornerstones in the earlier Swedish national identity 
were challenged, i.e. the stance of neutrality and being a role model in “modernity” and welfare state 
policies. The entry meant that Sweden could no longer see itself as neutral in the sense that was 
prevailing in the national consciousness and in the official post war rhetoric. The political foundations 
for a rhetoric of neutrality was established during the 19
th
 century - and - this rhetoric was given 
different interpretations and applications given the changing political circumstances during the 18
th
 
and 19
th
 centuries– where concepts such as non-alliance became especially salient - not at least during 
the Cold War. After the Second World War Sweden´s neutrality policy also became intertwined with 
international commitments in support of developing countries within the framework of United Nations 
(Stråth 2004).  
 
However, the new membership in EU/EEC, which was made possible after the fall of the iron wall and 
the ending of the Cold War, implied that Sweden no longer could see itself as a special role model in 
“modernity” and welfare state policies. The entrance into EU 1995 not only diminished Sweden´s 
independence in foreign policy matters, for example, with reference to its work in United Nations 
under the banner of neutrality. It also meant that Sweden more and more was seen by the states around 
the world as just one country among many in the European Community –  a state struggling with more 
or less the same kind of economical and political problems as the other member states (Johansson 
2004).  
 
The will to resign from the positions and national images mentioned above varies. Needless to say, 
those who agree with political arrangements of the welfare state are in general more reluctant to 
change than those who disagree. But the constituents of the national identity vary with the political 
and/or normative orientation in other ways as well. For example, the attitude towards migrants and the 
political arrangements of multiculturalism doubtlessly influence the propensity to accommodate the 
notion of Sweden as a multicultural and multiethnic country. Some depict Swedish society as 
benefited by cultural and ethnic diversity, other perceive migrants as intruders, and foster romantic 
nostalgia for a perceived homogenous and monocultural society in pre-war Sweden (an attitude that is 
exemplified among many voters of the populist right wing party Sverigedemokraterna).  
 
Some present-day constituents of the Swedish national identity are on the one hand shaped in line with 
the lingering propensity to regard Swedishness as progressive, modern and democratic, and on the 
other directly worked out in relation to - and dissociation from - the migrant population and non-
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European ethnic groups. For example, equality of opportunity between women and men is often 
referred to – in policy as well in as in public - as a typical Swedish value. In reverse, male migrants 
from the Middle East are frequently depicted as bearers of patriarchal cultures and thereby alien to the 
standards of the Swedish society (this argument is often deployed in the public debate by right-wing 
populists and other groupings that otherwise are quite indifferent to calls for equality between the 
sexes). A more formal aspect of the national identity in Sweden, the Swedish citizenship, will be 
discussed further below in this report, under the heading of “The definition of tolerance in Sweden”. 
3. Main cultural challenges  
Swedish society may – as was said before - be characterized as culturally diverse in several senses 
(i.e., external cultural influences, national minorities and certain migration flows from different parts 
of the world given the political crises and turmoil). Sweden did not become a country of immigration 
in a more substantial sense until after the World War II. It is important also to stress that different 
policies and official attitudes have appeared with reference to different minorities throughout history. 
(Roth 2005) In certain periods tolerance or respect has been shown towards certain immigrant groups 
and not to the national minorities. In later years, after 2000, and in some cases a positive recognition 
towards some of the national minorities and their customs and traditions has appeared (for example 
through educational support and language policies), a tolerance or a recognition that has not been 
granted towards several immigrant communities.  
 
The modern era of immigration to Sweden in the post war period can roughly be divided into four 
stages, with each stage representing different types of immigrants and immigration: 1) refugees from 
neighboring countries (1938 to 1948); 2) labor immigration from Finland and southern Europe (1949 
to 1971); 3) family reunification and refugees from developing countries (1972 to 1989), and 4) 
asylum seekers from southeastern and Eastern Europe, and the Middle east (1990 to present) and the 
free movement of EU citizens within the European Union. As a result of these differing flows, the 
once-dominant Scandinavians, who composed well over half of Sweden's foreign-born population in 
1960, made up only one-fourth of the foreign born in 2004 (Westin 2006). The population of Sweden 
today (2010) is 9,26 million and it is estimated that more than 12 percent of the population is of so-
called foreign background.  
 
Since the years following the end of World War II, the pattern of migration to Sweden is similar to 
other Western European countries (Runblom 1994). From the late forties to the early sixties, the 
migration was characterized by free movement between the European Community member states and 
the Nordic countries. In 1954, the Nordic countries set up a common labour market, which enabled 
large-scale migration from Finland to Sweden during the 1950s and 1960s. A total of 550,000 Finns 
migrated to Sweden during this time period. Substantial numbers also arrived from Denmark, Norway 
and Italy. Much of the immigration was a planned recruitment by Swedish enterprises and the Swedish 
Labour Market Board, and formal agreements were made between the Swedish government and 
governments in Central and Southern European countries. Through Sweden´s success in remaining 
outside the war, the country had a comparative advantage in the form of intact industrial facilities, 
which demanded an increased labour force after the end of the war – a situation which also 
characterises Switzerland. 
 
Swedish companies also turned to Yugoslavia and Greece for manpower, which initiated a substantial 
migration from these countries - just about 60,000 and 20,000 labour migrants, respectively. During 
the sixties, the labour market migration tended to be more spontaneous. Besides the recruitment of 
foreign labour carried out by major industrial companies, an increasing number of migrants started to 
come to Sweden in the 1960s on their own accord to find jobs. The flow of immigrants peaked in 
1970. Sweden did not set up a guest worker program like the German Federal Republic or Switzerland 
in order to meet labour demands. On the contrary, Sweden had a policy of permanent residence that 
treated labour migrants as future citizens (Westin 2006).  
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The spontaneous labour migration halted around 1973 in most West European countries, as a reaction 
to the so-called oil-crises and the following economic recession. Still, migration to Sweden halted one 
year earlier, just before the crisis, mainly as result of political pressure from the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation, LO. This marks the beginning of a new phase, during which migration is dominated by 
refugees. Earlier, in the 1950s and 1960s, those granted refugee status were placed within the same 
general framework as labour migrants, and the National Board of Labour was responsible for their 
resettlement. When labour migration halted, the institutional arrangements changed, and refugee status 
became important as a ground for permanent residence (Hammar 1985, Westin 2006).  
 
The first non-European refugees that were accepted by Sweden were the Ugandan Asians expelled in 
1972. 70,000 were forced to leave, and roughly 1,000 came to Sweden. In 1973, about 5,000 refugees 
from Chile were accepted after the coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende. All in all, 
Sweden accepted 18,000 refugees from Chile between 1973 and 1989. At the same time, 6,000 
refugees from other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru 
also came to Sweden. In addition, many refugees came from the Middle East during the 1970s and 
1980s. Christian Orthodox Syrians sought asylum because of religious persecution, and the Kurds 
were another salient group, seeking asylum on the grounds of political persecution, and emigrating 
from Eastern Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The largest groups from the Middle East were from Iran and Iraq; 
the Iranians arrived in the 1980s, mainly as a result of the war against Iraq and in opposition to the 
Islamic government in Tehran. Kurdish Iraqis started to arrive in the 1990s, mostly in response to 
increasing political oppression (Westin & Dingu-Kyrklund 2003).  
 
During this period, many migrants were granted asylum on humanitarian grounds. This allowed the 
immigration authorities meet the criticism from those liberal critics who claimed that Sweden didn’t 
live up to its commitments to the UN. By not recognizing these asylum seekers as UN Convention 
refugees, they did not enjoy the full rights to protection as written in the convention. As Charles 
Westin (2006) points out, Swedish authorities instead interpreted "humanitarian grounds" without 
having to follow international conventions. Thus, the authorities could change their interpretations if 
necessary. 
 
During the 1980s, the perception of an increased flow of refugees impelled the government to rule that 
political asylum applications would be treated more strictly and in accordance with the statements of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention. Then, humanitarian grounds for asylum would no longer be used. It is 
commonly held that this marks the beginning of new phase in Swedish immigration policy, when a 
stricter asylum policy was implemented. This step coincided with the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union and wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  
 
In the early 1990s, a significant number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
and Kosovo arrived to Sweden, and the government introduced visa requirements for persons coming 
from the former Yugoslavia. Still, there was support in the public opinion for assisting refugees from 
the Balkans, and 50,000 asylum seekers (mainly from Bosnia-Herzegovina) were granted temporary 
residence without having their individual cases tried. Today, immigrants continue to come from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo through family reunification provisions. Moreover, asylum seekers 
have continued to come from Iraq, above all since the 2003 US invasion (Westin 2006).  
 
In the middle of the 1990s, Sweden became a member of the European Union (EU), and this exerted a 
profound influence on Swedish migration policy. In 1996, Sweden became a party to the Schengen 
agreement, which allows for free movement of people across all Member States. From now on, other 
EU citizens were allowed to work and live in Sweden. Still, most cross-border movement affecting 
Sweden is from (and to) neighbouring Nordic countries, although Germany sends the most labour 
migrants. In relation to the EU-15, migration from Sweden has commonly been slightly greater than 
Tolerance and Diversity in Sweden  
13 
migration to Sweden - with an exception for migration from/to Denmark and Finland. In comparison 
to non-European immigration the numbers of EU immigrants are small, though (Westin 2006).  
 
The table below (Table 1) gives a short survey of the main minority and immigrant groups in Sweden, 
which is the five national native minority groups and the 20 largest immigrant groups, categorized 
with reference to country of origin. In the category of Swedish Finns, the numbers for the migrant and 
native groups are added together. More than the actual size of the group, we will also try to show some 
of the mayor dimensions of difference and differentiation which are regularly paid attention to. The 
parenthesis enclosing the “x” in some of the columns indicate that the status may be uncertain, 
contested or in a state of transition. For instance, it could be questioned whether having English as first 
language is an emblem of difference in everyday Swedish life or not. It may also be noted, that since 
some of the migrants from Turkey and Syria - such as the Assyrians and the Syrians - are Christians, 
they do not denote alterity in the same way as Muslim migrants do, although the orthodox Christian 
practices by those groups significantly differ from the forms which are exercised by the native 
protestant population.  
 
Moreover, some groups that earlier has been “othered” and categorized with reference to the racialized 
social category of “invandrare” (immigrant) has to gradually become associated with a general, neutral 
European identity. In general, there is a clear tendency that migrants from “western” countries - such 
as Denmark, Germany or the United States – very rarely if ever becomes categorized as “invandrare”, 
in Sweden, and the extension of that specific category is variable. Being categorized as “invandrare” is 
in general an experienced shared by migrants from the Asia, Latin America, Africa and – to certain 
extent – Eastern Europe, and not seldom also by their children, even though may be born in Sweden 
and hence lack experience of migration per se (Mulinari & Neergaard 2004). Rather than depicting an 
experience of migration, the category denotes a prescribed alterity. During the last decades, some 
migrants groups have gradually ceased to be regularly categorized as “invandrare”; the Finns are 
maybe the most apparent example of this redefinition.  
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Table 1: Main Minority Groups in Sweden and their Dimensions of Difference 
 
Dimensions of difference Number 
(thousands) 
Citizenship Racialized Religious Linguistic Perceived  
“cultural  
distance” 
National minorities       
Swedish Finns  
(born in Sweden) 
(born in Finland) 
675 
(500) 
(175) 
X   (X) 1-2 
Meänkieli * 40-70 X   (X) - 
Roma ** 30-65 X X   5-6 
Jews ** 25 X (X) X  4 
Saami ** 17 X X  X - 
Immigrant minorities  
(country of origin) 
      
Iraq 118 X X X X 5-6 
former Yugoslavia 71 X (X)  X 4-5*) 
Poland 68 X X  X 3-4 
Iran 60 X X X X 5-6 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 56 X X X X 4-5 
Germany 48 X   X 2-3 
Denmark 46 X    - 
Norway 44 X    1-2 
Turkey 41 X X (X) X 5 
Somalia 32 X X X X 5-6 
Thailand 29 X X X X 4-5 
Chile 28 X X  X 4-5 
Lebanon 24 X X X X - 
China 21 X X X X 5-6 
United Kingdom 20 X   (X) 2-3 
Syria  20 X X (X) X - 
Other forms of categories       
Muslims *** 100-250 X X X X - 
Sub Saharan Africans 80 X X X X - 
Sources: SCB (Statistiska centralbyrån), except where indicated: * Sveriges Radio, ** Nationalencyclopedin, *** Stenberg 
(2002). Perceived “cultural distance” is a measure utilized by Mella & Palm (2009:46). *) The number comes from the 
categories “croatians” and “serbs”.  
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The diversity of national minorities and the indigenous population the Saamis has been recognized 
through Sweden´s decision to ratify the Council of Europe´s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Hence, the 
following groups and languages are ascribed national minority status: Saami (even though the self-
perception often has been “an indigenous population”), Tornedal Finns (Meänkieli or Tornedals 
Finnish), Roma (Romany Chib) and Jews (Yiddish), Finns (Finnish). This special recognition of the 
national minorities constitutes a break with earlier political traditions. The multicultural policy of 
1975, as exemplified through the notion of freedom of choice (see below), had a more integrated or 
uniform stance towards national minorities and immigrant communities. For example, home language 
instruction was initiated for the national minorities at the same time and on the same premises as for 
the immigrant groups. 
 
The size of the minority groups in Sweden is hard to estimate because of the lack of ethnic statistics, 
which is forbidden in Sweden, as is statistics concerning religious background. However, more 
informal statistics circulates which could give a clue of the approximate numbers. What sets Sweden, 
Norway and Finland apart from other countries in Europe is the presence of an indigenous population 
– the Saamis - which presents special political and ethical challenges in comparison to other groups. 
The most striking issue has been the case of land rights and the debates concerning the importance of 
signing the ILO convention. 
 
In general, it is possible to claim that Swedes has accepted the multicultural condition. At least, they 
report a relatively positive experiences of and attitudes towards migration and migrants (Mella & Palm 
2008, 2009). More than 60 % of the population had good or very good experiences of working, 
studying or in other ways interacting with persons with immigrant background. No more than 14 % 
had negative or very negative experiences, and just above 20 % claim that they have no experiences of 
this specific kind of interaction. The experiences are not randomly distributed in the population 
though. A number of demographic or social factors have an effect: there is a positive correlation 
between level of education, sex/gender and the experiences concerned. The data shows data women 
and highly educated are more positive. The more educated a person were, the more positive his or her 
experiences were. But there are no significant findings when it comes to age; the differences are too 
small.  
 
This is not the whole picture, however. There is a body of research that also reports the incidence of 
intolerance towards migrants and minority groups – which may manifest itself in such forms as 
discrimination, harassment, insults, threats and physical violence. For example, a number of reports 
from a governmental committee on structural discrimination (cf. Pincus 1994) shows that recurrent 
patterns of everyday racism and indirect discrimination characterizes or affect the migrant existence in 
Sweden (Dahlstedt & Hertzberg 2005, Neergaard 2006). Other studies point to the proliferation of 
exclusionary mechanisms on the labour market, primarily targeting migrants (Behtoui 2004, 2006). On 
the other hand, some researchers states that assumptions of discrimination in the labour market are 
exaggerated, and that the problems for newcomers have more to do with the lack of an appropriate 
education and a changing economy/ labour market which also has affected the opportunities for 
several members of the majority population in a negative way (Carlson & Rooth 2007).  
 
The scope and signification of ethnic discrimination has, from time to time, been intensely debated in 
Swedish academia, and it’s hard to draw a conclusion in this specific matter. Nevertheless, it would 
definitely not make sense to deny the occurrences of racism and discrimination in everyday life of 
many migrants and minorities. It is relevant in this context to mention that segregation (such as 
housing segregation) may have its ground in various forms of discrimination and is often structured on 
the basis of non-Swedishness and not necessarily on the basis of specific ethnic backgrounds. Hence, 
the poorer neighbourhoods in the suburbs of the major cities of Sweden such as Stockholm, 
Gothenburg and Malmö are genuinely multi-ethnic, consisting of people of many origins (Bosnia, 
Chile, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon etc; Westin 2003).  
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The lack of tolerance and respect that native and/or migrant minority groups in Sweden experience 
come from different sources, and have different causes. Sometimes it targets groups which are 
ethnically defined, sometimes groups which are religiously defined. Sometimes it targets singular 
norms and customs, which could be more or less shared by different groups. And even though the 
social category of “race” is rejected in mainstream media and public debate, and common only in the 
discourses of right-wing extremist social movements, some exclusionary practices may undoubtedly 
be defined as “racialized” or overtly racist. In the following section, we will review the position of a 
number of minority groups in Sweden, whose practices and worldviews sometimes are met with a lack 
of respect and tolerance, and also suffer from outright discrimination. Following the argument outlined 
above, we will focus and different forms of group formations – religiously, ethnically and “racially” 
defined – and how they are treated by the ethno-nationalistic defined majority.  
Saami  
The Sámi are Europe’s northernmost and the Nordic countries’ only indigenous people. Saami 
ancestral lands span an area of approximately 388,350 km2, almost the size of Sweden. The Saami 
languages are a part of the Finno-Lappic group of the Uralic language family. Traditionally, the Saami 
have pursued a variety of livelihoods, including coastal fishing, fur trapping, and sheep herding. Their 
best known means of livelihood is semi-nomadic reindeer herding. Only about 10% of the total Saami 
population is connected with it, but it remains an important industry among Saami in Sweden. The 
estimated (inofficial) number of Saami living in Sweden is somewhere between 20 000 and 35 000, of 
which 8 000 has registered for voting in the Saami parliament.  
 
Trade between externals and the Saami began during the middle ages, as did the colonization of the 
Saami area and the exploitation of its resources by non-Saami, and this process was intensified during 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Following the consolidation of the states adjacent to the Saami 
area, several states claimed sovereignty in the region and the Saami were forced to pay tax to several 
crowns. Also, Christianization followed during this process of intensified pressure from the outside. In 
time, the nations that had claimed Saami as their own divided up the Saami area.  
 
In 1751, the border was drawn up by Sweden and Denmark-Norway, dividing Saami along the 
mountain ridge from Jämtland to Finnmark. The border between Sweden and Finland was established 
in 1809, and in 1826 the border between Norway and Russia was established, thereby completing the 
division of Saami. Despite the colonization and division of the Saami area, the Saami people were able 
to maintain some independence. When the national border between Sweden and Denmark-Norway 
was established, the Saami were guaranteed ownership of land and water in what was known as the 
Codicil to the Border Treaty (1751).  
 
The land issue continues to be of uttermost importance for the Saami group, even in the present. With 
the practice of reindeer herding, which is central to the Saami way of life and often regarded as the 
defining feature of Sami culture, the Saami exhibit a slightly different form of territorial organization, 
which could be characterized as flexible and overlapping, in comparison to the modern property 
system of the European states which colonized them. Contradictions between these two conceptions of 
territoriality have been a defining feature of state-Sami relations in the following ways: 
 
1. Nordic states viewed the Sami as nomadic, thus having no ownership of their land. 2. 
Traditional Sami activities, notably reindeer herding, were viewed as illegitimate or backwards, 
resulting in the privileging of modern forms of land use such as agriculture. 3. Where states did 
feel an impulse to protect the Sami way of life, they viewed nomadic pastoralism as economically 
non-viable, prompting systems of administration which increased state regulation of herding 
(Forrest 1998:ii, cf. Eide 2001). 
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During the last decades, roughly one thousand land owners has taken Saami reindeer herds to court, in 
an effort to keep them from grazing reindeer in private forests (Borchert 2001). The landowners base 
their law suits on claims that the reindeers rub the antlers on young trees, which damages their private 
pine plantations. The courts that try the numerous cases require proof that the use of the land in 
question is a part of an ancient tradition, and in general they require proofs that are different from the 
ones the defendant Saami has provided, namely written documents that demonstrate an almost century 
long period of continuous grazing-use for the land under dispute. The history and traditions of the 
Saami are mainly oral, and the kinds of documents required simply do not exist, however. The claims 
of the court has, because of that, been acknowledges as absurd from a Saami viewpoint, especially in 
those cases where archeological evidence of Saami land use can be found (Borchert 2001, p. 42).  
 
Needless to say, since this conflict influence one of the cornerstones – if not the cornerstone – of 
Saami economy, way of living and group identity, it has far-reaching consequences for the group 
(Borchert 2001). Threats to the reindeer herding has a potential to undermine notions of autonomy, 
self-determination, group distinctiveness and cohesion – at least among Saami in Sweden. According 
to Saami organizations, the claims of the landowners challenge the customary rights of the Saami 
people. Still, the judgment went in favor of the Saami defendants on the lower juridical instances, but 
no verdict has been recorded in the Supreme Court yet.  
 
Furthermore, reindeer breeding and keeping has often been counteracted on local level. There are a 
number of examples when conflicts have arisen around land rights. The rights and the interests of 
farmers and landowners in northern Sweden have clashed with the rights and the interests of the 
Saami, when migratory reindeers have damaged plants in forests and arable land. Although the rights 
of the Sami in part are regulated in law, the prejudices and negative stereotyping to Sami among other 
people living in northern Sweden has been accompanied with a marked lack of tolerance towards their 
rights to preserve their main industry, and thereby their way of living. 
 
A quick glance at the Swedish history of ideas shows that the knowledge on the Saami group that was 
produced during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, and circulated in academia and mainstream media, 
was informed of the racializing stereotypes and representational conventions that were common back 
then. The Saami were regularly depicted as the inferior Other, belonging to another race and not 
having reached the same level of civilization as the rest of the population. In line with this frame of 
interpretation, collected from racial biology and Social Darwinism, segregation laws were formulated 
during the first decades of the twentieth century.  
 
Segregation took a number of forms. The Saami group suffered from this in a number of ways. One 
example in the field of education was the nomadic ”kåta schools” introduced after 1913, where Saami 
children received an education that was said to be adapted to their specific life conditions in the Arctic 
tundra. Here the Saami received an inadequate education characterized by stereotypes and insufficient 
means, which reinforced their alienation from the Swedish state and the rest of society. A group such 
as the Saami has been exposed to both segregation and assimilation strategies from the state depending 
upon the sphere of activity and the specific time and context. With respect to religion (Lutheran 
Christianity) the general stance from the state could often be characterizes as assimilatory been 
assimilation while segregation strategies often prevailed in areas such as social life, work and 
education.  
 
For several decades during the 20
th
 century, speaking Saami languages was not allowed in the 
elementary school during school time. Sami wasn’t even a school subject in the nomadic school. The 
Sami children were not given the opportunity to learn to read and write in their own language. It was 
quite common among older generations of Sami of have Saami only as a social language, and use 
Swedish to read and write. Thus, the right to education in their own languages has been a key issue for 
Saami activists.  
 
Hans-Ingvar Roth & Fredrik Hertzberg  
18 
The generation exposed to unpleasant experiences from their school years chose to a greater part to 
not speak Sami with their own children. As adults, many of the 60’s and 70’s generations cannot 
speak Sami “although they should be able to”. They have Sami as a passive language to a more or 
less degree. It can be a rather steep threshold to reclaim one’s language, and many speak of 
“psychological barriers”. Here there is a need for great education efforts and a positive attitude 
from the surrounding society, both the Sami and the Swedish (Sametinget 2011). 
 
Still, the right to education in Saami language is seldom contested in present day Sweden. There is a 
state funded Saami school in Sweden today, centrally administrated by Sameskolstyrelsen (SamS, The 
Sami Education Board), although education in the Saami language at primary or secondary level did 
not exist until 1976, when the Swedish government introduced home language education for 
immigrant children and linguistic minorities. The goals of Sami school education are stated in the 
curriculum. The Sami school is responsible that every pupil after graduating: a) is familiar with his or 
her Sami background and cultural heritage, b) can speak, read and write in Saami. In addition to this 
the regular goals of the compulsory school system apply. According to the Saami School Decree all 
education should be given in Sami and Swedish, and the subject Saami is obligatory in every grade 
(SamS 2011).  
 
Thus, it could reasonably be argued that the right to education in Saami language is publically and 
officially accepted and recognized, and could be described through the notion of recognition. In 
reverse, the land claims by Saami are neither publically nor officially accepted and/or recognized in 
their entirety. As noted earlier, the demand of special land rights - in the sense of article 169 in the 
ILO convention - has not been seen favourably by the Swedish government, which has had a long 
tradition of scepticism towards notions such as cultural autonomy and self-determination. Hence, this 
negative stance could be described with the notion of non-tolerance.  
 
As noted above, there are several and recurrent disputes between Saami reindeer herds and non-Saami 
land-owners on the local level, and between juridical bodies and Saami actors on regional and national 
level. As a guarded conclusion, it could reasonably be said that the conflicts over land-use remains to 
be a question where Saami claims are neither fully accepted nor recognized – although it would be a 
mistake to categorize the viewpoint of Swedish authorities as totally indifferent or neglectful of Saami 
land interests.  
Roma  
As in many other European countries, the discrimination, hostility and lack of tolerance of Roma have 
a long history. For example, during the so-called Age of Liberty (1718- 1772), when Sweden began its 
retreat to small power status, policies regarding cultural divergence were tightened. There was a 
particular focus on religious and behavioural ”deviants”. As a typical example of increasing 
xenophobia during this period, the historian Hugo Valentin cites a statute of 1741 which decreed that  
 
all Jews, Savoyards, tightrope walkers, actors and other jesters … Tartars and Gypsies who with 
diverse ungodliness, fortune telling and lies cause great trouble and inconvenience to ordinary 
people, and also other such foreigners, who with barometers, different sorts of glass, tea and such 
less necessary goods arrive and who abscond with honest money” shall immediately be expelled 
from the kingdom (Valentin 1964).  
 
Although members of the Roma group today share the formal civil and political rights which are 
included in Swedish citizenship, it could be argued that they lack some of the significant social rights 
in terms of their fulfilment such as educational rights. During the span of the 20
th
 century, they were 
more or less forced to abandon their main industries, and the life forms associated with it; this process 
was completed in the 1960s. Since then, the policy towards Roma from official bodies has been 
characterized by different inclusionary - rather than excluding - measures, albeit seldom designed 
“from the inside”, in other words how the needs of the group are assessed by the members themselves. 
Moreover, their religious or cultural rights have not often been denied by official bodies. (In this 
Tolerance and Diversity in Sweden  
19 
context it is relevant to claim that the Roma group is heterogeneous in terms of religious belongings, 
depending upon the members historical backgrounds. However, in recent years many members of the 
Roma community have gravitated towards Christian evangelical churches in Sweden; cf. Roth 2005.) 
 
Since Sweden does not allow for ethnic registration, and thus do not have statistical databases relevant 
for an estimation of the living conditions among the Roma, all descriptions of the social conditions 
must be tentative. However, other sources of information concludes that the living conditions of Roma 
in Sweden is relatively poor, and that they are more or less excluded from mainstream Swedish society 
(cf. SOU 2010:55). One can discern a strong pattern of social, economic and political exclusion and 
marginalization. Living standards are lower than average. Considerable health problems are reported, 
and life expectancy is judged to be clearly below average. At a rough estimate, 80 percent of adult 
Roma are unemployed. Most Roma children do not complete primary school, and very few continue to 
secondary school. This being so, even fewer reaches university level.  
 
Discrimination is widespread. Attitudes towards Roma are more negative than towards any other 
group, and they suffer strongly from labour market exclusion. According to Geza Nagy (2007, in 
Palusuo 2008), the unemployment rate is considerably over the average. The exclusion is, Nagy 
continues, a consequence of several factors, such as failures in the educational system, lack of demand 
for services from “traditional” Roma industries, and widespread negative attitudes towards Roma in 
general. The governmental white paper quoted above draws a similar conclusion:  
 
Attitudes towards Roma are more negative than towards any other group. They remain the most 
clearly discriminated group on the labour market at all stages: when they seek a job, during the 
interview, and in case they did get the job they risk losing it if their ethnicity becomes known. 
(SOU 2010:55, p. 36, cf. Westin & Tan Marti 2008) 
 
Moreover, discrimination in the housing sector is also reported, in public as well as private housing; 
discrimination within the housing market stands out as a very large problem for Romanies, it is 
concluded in report from the governmental agency Diskrimineringsombudsmannen (DO, the Equality 
Ombudsman; DO 2003), which put together complaints from Roma during the last two decades. Some 
of the complaints concern statements where Romanies are named as undesirable tenants. They also 
encounter negative attitudes, prejudice and insults from neighbours. There are examples of tenants 
protesting with name lists against Roma who about to move in to a building, and of neighbours 
organising against them moving into an area, out of fear that their residences will depreciate in value. 
 
Since they have met far-reaching difficulties in entering the labour market, and also been subject to 
negative stereotyping and ethnic discrimination, and partly (or mainly) as a consequence of those 
excluding activities, they have not been able to obtain the rights implied by the social citizenship of 
the welfare state (Marshall 1950). Their access to the political rights implied in the notion of citizenship 
may also be questioned, at least in the sense that a lack of representation can be noted. “Roma are 
virtually absent from politics” (SOU 2010:55, s. 36) the above mentioned white paper claims; their 
civic organisations are weakly developed and they lack official representation as a minority, and there 
is no “umbrella” organisation on the national level. 
 
Apart from the general exclusion processes, a certain lack of recognition can be noted, in the 
educational system (Rodell Olgac 2006) and elsewhere. For instance, children do not have full access 
to education in their mother tongue as stipulated in law (Skolverket 2007), and there is no or little 
mentioning of Roma as a national minority in school books. Moreover, Roma cultural institutions and 
media are few and with scarce resources and do not have a secure financial situation. The culture and 
language of Roma Travellers is endangered, much because of the stigma connected with being a 
Traveller.  
 
Some of the cases of discrimination that have been filed at the DO (DO 2003), and that concerns 
discrimination in everyday life, may also give a hint of how the lack of tolerance and recognition vis-
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à-vis Roma in Sweden is constituted. In general, it concerns the forms of discrimination that makes 
goods and services unavailable. Not making goods and services available is form of discrimination 
treated under the Swedish law on discrimination (2003:307) in the Penal Code. Discrimination 
concerning goods and services is often about Roma being denied access to shops, restaurants and 
hotels, or in other ways are being treated in a discriminatory fashion by establishments.  
 
In a questionnaire survey in the DO report, 27 percent report that they have been refused entry into 
shops, on one or several occasions, and almost 40 percent state that they have been refused entry into 
restaurants during the past two years. The same numbers say that they have been treated badly in 
shops or restaurants during the past year. In the report, it becomes obvious the acts of discrimination 
occur when one or more female members of a group wears the traditional dress that many women 
among the Kaali Roma - a group that migrated from Finland to Sweden in the 1950:s and 60:s – wear 
(DO 2003, p. 18). It seems like that this dress, consisting of blouses with embroideries and heavy 
skirts of thick, black velvet, becomes a highly visible symbol for a rejected Roma identity, which 
triggers of a discriminatory agency.  
 
Thus, it can be said that Roma claims on acceptance and recognition has been met at the official level 
– but only to a certain degree. What is lacking is the financial and organizational official support that 
follows from at least some strong definitions of recognition, i.e. the definition inherent in the official 
Swedish multiculturalism from 1975. Following the argument outlined just above, it could also be 
argued that tolerance and recognition towards some cultural practices which express a Roma identity 
is absent in the everyday life of mainstream Swedish society. For instance, the (female) followers of 
the traditional dress-code of Kaali Roma identity runs the risk of discriminated in restaurants, hotels 
and/or shops.  
Muslims  
As in many other European countries, at least west European, Muslims in general and religious 
Muslims in particular has been singled out in Sweden as a matter of interest, suspicion and debate 
during the decade following the attack on World Trade Centre, New York, in 2001. Muslims has 
become a highly visible minority in Swedish society, and the enactment of Muslim belief practices has 
caught public attention in many different ways. Still, the attention is frequently mixed with suspicion, 
and anti-Muslim sentiments and opinions have been reported, as well as relatively high frequency of 
outright discrimination. Against the background of militant forms of Islam and terrorist attacks - lately 
the suicide bomber in Stockholm in December 2010 - generalizations and stereotypes about Islam and 
Muslims have become more widespread and amounts to “Islamophobia” especially among members 
of right-wing populist parties (Gardell 2010).  
 
What characterizes the group in itself? Arguably, Sweden has one of the most heterogeneous Muslim 
populations of all Western European countries. They have different ethnic, political, linguistic and/or 
educational backgrounds. They come from over forty different countries in north and sub-Saharan 
Africa; from Arabic, Turkish or Persian parts of Asia, and from Europe. They come from secularized 
states as Turkey, religious states such as Iran, and from former socialistic states such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina and several of the new states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union. Clearly, this 
heterogeneity makes it hard to make categorizations about Muslims in general (Sander 2004).  
 
The Islamic institutionalization in Sweden has, from a slow start in the 1960s and 1970s, begun to 
move into a consolidation phase during the past few years has. Swedish Muslims have now achieved 
what Åke Sander (2004) calls a “rudimentary institutional completeness”; i.e. many of the most 
essential Islamic and Muslim institutions - such as mosques, musallas, Muslim periodicals, Muslim 
burial grounds, pre-schools, schools and shops - now exists in Sweden. According to Sander, it could 
be argued that they are manifesting a physical and ideological presence in Sweden, and more and more 
Swedes are beginning to consider them an integral part of Swedish domestic religious life, as 
Swedish Muslims. 
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Despite the fact that the institutionalization of Islam has developed during the last decade, it could also 
be said that many Muslims finds it hard to enact their religiosity in a proper way, according to the 
norms and beliefs inherent in their faith (Sander 2004). One reason for this could, according to Åke 
Sander (2004), be found in the discrepancies between different perspectives on religion; or, more 
exactly, different viewpoints on the notion, nature, position and place of religion in a society. In 
Sweden, there is widespread notion – which probably is common in other secular countries as well – 
that religion should not be allowed to affect your behaviour outside your very private sphere, in the 
public life. Society, its institutions and representatives should be impartial, rational and objective, i.e. 
non-religious and secular. With this slightly secular perspective on religion, it could be said that it has 
disappeared as common or wide-spread “frame of interpretation”, as way of see, interpret and 
understand how other people act and think.  
 
When applying this “secular frame of interpretation”, it could be hard to understand that some religion 
could mean something else than for a secular person, and that the scope and application of religiously 
motivated norms, rules, attitudes and practices by far exceed what is generally perceived as 
appropriate in (for example) Sweden, viz. confined to the private sphere. The presence of a “secular 
frame of interpretation” might also explain why so many expressions of Islamic faith have received 
negative attention during the last decade. For example, the construction of Mosques does seldom take 
place in silence; frequent and high-pitched voices of rejection and disapproval are common, and when 
the buildings once are completed, the congregations receive numerous threats and insults (Gardell 
2010). The opposition is evident (Integrationsverket 2005, 2006), and two mosques has been burned 
down. Moreover, women wearing burqa or niqab report being harassed in public (Berge & Manga 
2006, Gardell 2010). Widespread calls for prohibition of burqa and niqab are raised. Those acts of 
depreciation are not only caused by different views on religiosity or piety; as Mattias Gardell (2010) 
has argued, one can also track the effect of Islamophobic ways of thinking in present-day Sweden. 
There is a tendency to understand and depict the agency of migrants from Muslim societies in general 
and Islamic believers in particular as unreflective, rigid and fundamentalist.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be said that certain claims from active Islamic believers are met in Sweden, at 
least formally. Despite the limitations discussed in the beginning, the institutionalization of Islam is in 
process. The most basic religious needs have been met, with certain degree of support from local 
municipalities, the Swedish church, etc. On the other hand, a wide-spread (but actually declining; cf. 
Gardell 2010, pp. 223-24) suspicion - or even contempt - to certain belief practices continues to 
constitute an obstacle to the enactment of Islam in Sweden, and towards a fully developed recognition, 
or even acceptance, of Islam in Sweden.  
Sub-Saharan Africans  
The groups of Sub-Saharan migrants in Sweden come up to just above 80 000 persons. They are 
composed of the most nationalities from the African continent, but among the most numerous groups 
we find migrants from Somalia (32 000), Ethiopia (13 000), Eritrea (9 000), Gambia (3 500) and 
Uganda (3 000). (As a geographical term, Sub-Saharan refers to the area of the African continent 
which lies south of the Sahara. The political definition of Sub-Saharan Africa, instead, covers African 
countries which are fully or partially located south of the Sahara.)  
 
Different measures for estimating the economic integration of migrants in Sweden suggest concordant 
conclusions: Sub-Saharan migrants face the most far-reaching obstacles in their efforts to get a 
position in the Swedish society. African-born migrants are the group most likely to be unemployed or 
subjected to discrimination in the Swedish labour market, and employers perceive African-born as 
more different than the European-born migrants. For example, the chance for a migrant from Sub-
Saharan Africa to find a job which matches his/her education or training is over 60 percent less 
compared to a native Swede (Integrationsverket 2002). Also, the most low-paid groups in the Swedish 
labour market are found among the African born migrants (Englund 2003).  
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The relative lack of economical integration in Swedish society is to a certain degree followed by a lack 
of social integration. Numerous studies of “perceived cultural distance” among native Swedes point in 
that direction (Lange 1992, Mella & Palm 2008, 2009, 2010). The category of Africans or specific 
African nationalities such as the Somali (Mella & Palm 2008, 2009, 2010) is thus placed at the far end 
of a continuous scale where notions of similarity or difference should be measured. Obviously, what is 
perceived and constructed as “African culture” - or “Somali culture” - among Swedes moulds a gestalt 
that signifies difference, or even radical difference. Needless to say, this affects those who are forced 
to represent this alterity. In-depths studies (Sawyer 2000, 2008) and reports (Gärding 2009) of the 
identity formations of young people of African descent in Sweden shows that the experience of racial 
categorization and harassment is a manifest part of their everyday life – although the strategies 
developed to cope with it differ in a variety of ways.  
 
A number of scholars (Mulinari & Neergaard 2005, Sawyer 2000, 2008) claim that the willingness to 
acknowledge the scope of those expressions are very limited, for instance among scholars, civil 
servants and other “key actors”. During a fieldwork on the formation of Black, African identities in 
Sweden, social anthropologist Lena Sawyer noted that  
 
National and transnational stories of Sweden and Swedes are often imbued with a particular 
righteous morality. And though Swedish informants generally did not discuss, or even name, the 
Atlantic slave trade I would argue that Sweden's absence from this past subtly imbues this 
(national) locality and people with a particular moral character in relation to discussions of racism. 
[…] If Swedish morality is achieved, in part, through exclusion from hegemonic histographies of 
the Atlantic slave trade, Swede's often built upon narratives of peripherality and marginality to 
continental European history when discussing racism. […]If at all, in Sweden racism was most 
often described as the violent behaviors of deviant, confused, unemployed boys and men who 
lived in small rural communities. Their stories all seemed to quietly say “racism is something 
foreign to the Swedish society” as they metaphorically pointed their fingers outward, away from 
themselves, and sought to locate the “real” racists (Sawyer 2008, pp. 16-17)  
 
Thus, following Sawyers argument, the historical experience of being located at the margins of the 
Europeans society has facilitated the formation of a national identity in which a particular righteous 
morality and a denial of racism is a characteristic feature. Although a righteous morality generally 
could be viewed as a part of ethnic or national self-presentations, not only in Sweden (cf. Eriksen 
1993), it may still be claimed that this quite widespread and generic denial make it hard for young 
persons of sub-Saharan descent to cope with the actual occurrences of racism (cf. Sawyer 2005).  
 
In tandem with the argument that we outlined about the acceptance and recognition of Roma culture, 
that the prevalence of racist or racializing stereotypes make up certain obstacles to the enactment of 
the norms, values and expressions that sub-Saharan Africans share, whether they are related to an 
ethnic or national identity, or a general African identity. Although there’s a lack of research on this 
particular topic in Sweden, it might be said that stereotyping, discrimination and hostility have a 
restraining effect to the public display of cultural expressions. Still, there is no particular cultural 
expression of sub-Saharan African groups in Sweden that has been opposed as frequent and large-
scale as the opposition to the construction of mosques and the wearing of burqa or the niqab. 
4. The definition of tolerance in Sweden 
Policies towards different immigrant and minority groups during the first two decades of the post-war 
era were in general purely assimilatory, and the tolerance for or recognition of various cultural 
identities and customs was by and large absent from the official political agenda and the public 
discussion. In addition, there was no systematic reception policy. The period of assimilationist policy 
was not put to an end until 1975, when multiculturalism became an important element in the Swedish 
model of welfare-state politics. The new policy established the principles that have guided Sweden’s 
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immigration policy ever since: According to Ålund and Schierup (1991), Sweden's multicultural 
immigrant policy could be viewed as a rejection of a “guest worker” strategy for labour import; with 
its quest to create social equality among ethnic groups, respect for immigrants ways of living, and with 
an emphasis on providing immigrants and ethnic minorities with resources to exercise political 
influence. In Swedish multiculturalism, welfare ideology objectives focused on “equality” (jämlikhet) 
occupy a central position. Other policy objectives include “freedom of choice” (valfrihet) and 
“partnership” (samverkan).  
 
Tomas Hammar (1985) summarizes the original intent of these three principles - which paraphrases 
the French revolution's liberte, egalite, et fraternite - as follows: 
 
The goal of equality implies the continued efforts to give immigrants the same living standard as the rest 
of the population. The goal of freedom of choice implies that public initiatives are to be taken to assure 
members of ethnic and linguistic minorities domiciled in Sweden a genuine choice between retaining and 
developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity. The goal of partnership 
implies that the different immigrant and minority groups on the one hand and the native population on the 
other both benefit from working together (Hammar 1985: 33) 
 
These goals were formulated in the mid-1970s, and it was implicated in this program that foreigners 
not only would enjoy the same legal privileges as Swedish citizens, but also that the general public 
should accept multicultural aims. Moreover, the proclaimed egalitarian and multicultural ideology has 
substantial legal backing. In most important matters, formal equality before the law holds true, as for 
example equal access to unemployment contributions and a large number of other social welfare 
benefits.  
 
Officially, there has been a strong emphasis on the formula “same rights-same responsibilities” in 
public policymaking. Models opr ideas of differentiated citizenship, implying different rights and 
provisions depending on one’s groups status, has not gained wide-spread acceptance in the public 
debate, and have never exerted any influence on Swedish citizenship legislation. As Dag Blank and 
Mattias Tydén notes, “one salient characteristic of the Swedish welfare state during the 20th century 
has been a model of general and uniform policies, for all citizens” (Blanck & Tydén 1995, p. 64). It is 
obvious that this political tradition influences contemporary legislation and policy. Nevertheless, 
Sweden introduced a new citizenship law in 2001, and then it became possible to have dual 
citizenship.  
 
The Swedish Citizenship Act of 2001 differs in several respects from previous laws such as the 
citizenship laws of 1894, 1924 and 1950. The law of 2001 has opened up the door for some ius solis 
considerations with the purpose to avoid statelessness even though the ius sanguinis principle is still 
operating in a striking way. According to the current legislation a child acquires Swedish citizenship 
by birth under condition that the mother is a Swedish citizen and the child can also get citizenship by 
birth if the child was born in Sweden and if the father is a Swedish citizen. However, in the previous 
mentioned citizenship laws the principle of ius sanguinis was the main, overriding principle. The 
Citizenship Act of 2001 also accepts dual nationality which was previously not allowed and the act has 
also strengthened the importance of the principle of domicile and the will to engage and identify 
oneself with the new country. (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010, Sandesjö & Björk 2009)  
 
The content of the requirements for gaining citizenship in the Citizenship Act of 2001 is rather “thin” 
compared to several other countries in Europe, (and other countries in the world). There is no language 
requirement in the Swedish citizenship law and the new citizens do not need to express an oath of 
loyalty to the country. Different political debates during the last decade have shown how controversial  
the language requirement is. According to some critics it has often been interpreted as a strategy of 
“blaming the victim” in cases where the authorities have not provided enough educational support or – 
as an unnecessary requirement - given the plausible assumption that it is in the interest of long term 
residents to master the language of the majority population (Roth 2005); however, a “good conduct” 
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requirement has been more emphasized in recent years which imply that persons who have committed 
crimes have to wait longer until they gain citizenship status (Lokrantz Bernitz 2010, Bengtsson, 
Strömblad & Bay 2010). The rights that are exclusive for citizens - compared to more or less 
permanent residents - are also few, as for example the right to vote in elections for Parliament, the 
prohibition against deportation and the status of being eligible for important public offices.   
 
The introduction of the Citizenship Act of 2001 could be seen in the light of an increased 
internationalization of the Swedish society. As was mentioned before, Sweden became a member of 
the EU in 1995 which opened up the doors for more migrants from EU countries. The increased 
migration from various countries around the world also meant that more “multinational” marriages 
evolved. Before the new act on citizenship was introduced Sweden ratified the European Convention 
of Nationality from 1997. This convention, which has been ratified by 12 countries in Europe, has as 
one of its main purposes to make it easier to gain dual citizenship and introduce “good practice” in the 
field of citizenship law such as more reliability, “neutrality” and inclusiveness. The convention is open 
not just for members of the European Council but also for other countries - including Non-European 
states. However, in the Swedish case members of the neighbouring Nordic countries still receive a so-
called preferential treatment, concerning principles of naturalisation and the conditions for acquiring 
citizenship through notifications.  
 
Another important legal achievement of Swedish immigrant policy has been the granting to foreign 
citizens of the right to vote in local elections, which first was exercised in the local elections of 1976. 
The voting rights amendment to the Swedish constitution was also considered as a way means of 
giving immigrants access to the advantages of the welfare state, and at the same time safeguarding 
their right to autonomous cultural development (Ålund & Schierup 1991). All in all, it could be said 
that the policy of multiculturalism provided a legal and moral foundation to support “freedom of 
choice”, to encourage “partnership”, to give “equality” a social basis, and to prevent ethnic conflicts 
and the development of a segregated society. A political consensus was instituted, which embraced 
government and state institutions, as well as political parties (across the traditional left-right spectrum) 
and important social movements.  
 
The policies of Swedish multiculturalism - and the concomitant legislation - of 1975 were 
characterized by an endeavor for recognition of minority rights, but it could also be defined as an 
extrapolation of the Swedish welfare model. It was held that the goal of equality should be enlarged 
with the goal of “freedom of choice”, by assuring the members of ethnic and linguistic minorities a 
genuine choice between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish 
cultural identity. In so far, the reformist socialist ideas of the Social democracy underpinned this 
policy, with its emphasis on equality. But the policy was also influenced by a liberal, individualistic 
political philosophy, with its focus on individuals and individual rights and skepticism towards group-
orientated rights, such as collective self-determination, land-rights and cultural autonomy. As an 
example of this particular skepticism, we find the long-time prohibition of butchery in line with Halal 
and Kosher rules. The regulation on animal husbandry has always been overridden the freedom of 
religion in this particular issue (Blanck & Tydén 1995). More generally, the Swedish legal system has 
shown very limited interest in and acceptance of the idea that ethnic belonging and cultural traits could 
be recognized as a reason for differential legal treatment (Nygren 1999).  
 
Thus, it might be said that the policy of 1975 suffered from compartmentalization: calls for 
recognition of collective, cultural practices was mixed together with a classical, liberal emphasis of 
individual rights. Consequently, it did not take long until the multicultural policy was heavily 
criticized. For instance, some scholars claimed that the policy as designed from the vantage point of an 
aesthetic and narrow conception of culture (e.g. Rojas 1993 & Roth 1996; cf. Hertzberg 2003). The 
expressions promoted under the heading of “freedom of choice” were besides the publication of exile 
newspapers, magazines or journals, mainly folkloristic in character: literature, poetry, dances and 
music. Consequently, the prospect of possible conflicts between values, norms and ways of living 
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were seldom addressed especially concerning family matters. Although these issues has been 
discussed in the state sponsored research commission mentioned above, the development of a praxis 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s following the guidelines inherent in multicultural policy reveals 
that the full complexity of the cultures implied in the notion multiculturalism was slightly 
underestimated.  
 
But a change was about to come. Subsequently, the authorities recognized that the multiculturalism 
developed in practice was limited in scope. During the 1980s, a number of governmental white papers 
pointed to the need of recognizing the width of promises inherent in liberal, multicultural political 
philosophy. Moreover, they also highlighted a perceived risk of “cultural clashes” between norms and 
considered to be “typically” Swedish such as the ideal of gender equality and those held to be alien 
and external to Swedish society. Less than a decade after its implementation, a discourse was 
articulated which stressed the limits to multiculturalism; the relatively progressive articulation of 
multicultural policy was circumscribed by a perceived need to clarify what was inherently Swedish 
culture, and a need to clarify which norms and values that are unconditional to the Swedish society 
(and thus mandatory for migrants to conform to). Hence, the scope of what was tolerated and 
recognized was diminished. Still, one central mechanism for fulfilling the multiculturalistic goal of 
recognition was by and large left intact. The minority organizations still had the possibility to receive 
economical support for activities that strengthened their culture and ethnic identity (Ålund & Schierup 
1991).  
 
It might be said that the wish to narrow the scope of multiculturalism followed a changing pattern in 
migration. As stated earlier, the migration changed quite dramatically in the early 1970’ies, when 
labour migration halted and gradually was replaced by refugee migration. From now on, the majority 
of the migrants came from countries outside Europe (in Latin America, the Middle East or Africa). 
Earlier on, during the 1960’ies, it was claimed in governmental white papers that migration from so-
called “culturally distant” countries necessitated a stronger emphasis on what was perceived as 
inevitable and unconditional in Swedish society (Hertzberg 2003), in order to avoid “adaption 
problems”. Whether this call for making the “unconditionally Swedish” explicit during the 1980’ies 
was caused by concerns for - or fears of? - the “culturally distant” or not hasn’t really been examined, 
though.  
 
We witnessed a distinctive shift in Swedish multiculturalism policy during the mid-1990’s. In 1995, 
the multicultural policy based on equality, freedom of choice and partnership was replaced with a new 
policy, with a focus on integration. The issue of inclusion of migrants into society was by and large 
transformed to a matter of inclusion of migrants into the labour market, and integrations policy 
consisted mainly of measures promoting employability (still, it must also be stressed that the legal 
rights of the minorities were left unchanged). From the vantage point of labour market conditions, the 
new policy puts its emphasis on the responsibilities and rights of the individual - not his or her 
affiliations. Thereafter, the political rhetoric in Sweden´s integration and minority politics often 
contains the words “same rights and responsibilities” and “same possibilities” (Roth 2006), although 
the focus in public debate was firmly put on migrant responsibilities, not minority rights. But the 
rights of the migrants were not altogether forgotten, we also witnessed an increased attention to ethnic 
discrimination, and the non-discriminatory laws were strengthened. But the ideal of a multicultural 
Sweden as well as the recognition of cultural differences was more and more downgraded. When 
affirmative action or special rights for minorities were accepted, they were only seen as something that 
could be employed temporarily, as a way of solving problems for relatively newly arrived immigrant 
groups.  
 
Some other important changes during the 1990’s in the discourse on multiculturalism and tolerance 
could be noted. It became more and more usual that advocates of multiculturalism – or similar 
political ideas – tended to support the value of a multiethnic or multicultural society. The notion of 
“mångfald” (diversity) became a catch-word in policy and public debate, focussing on economical 
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values and other positive effects, but not so much on the moral virtues of tolerance and respect (de los 
Reyes 2001). Thus, the language of economics gained priority over the language of ethics and human 
rights in many debates on migration and the multiethnic condition, especially in the field of 
“integrationspolitik” - i.e. policies aimed at integrating migrants in different spheres in Swedish 
society (Hertzberg 2003).   
 
All the same, the attempts to delineate the basic norms of Swedish society has since the late 1980’ies 
been a central issue in the public policies on integration, tolerance and recognition (Hertzberg 2003). 
For instance, when a new educational policy for primary and secondary education, Lpo 94 and Lpf 94, 
was developed during the mid 1990s, it was clearly stated that education in Swedish schools should be 
firmly based on a set of values considered to be Swedish, and also derived from a Western and 
Christian tradition. This statement was especially expressed by the Christian democrats (KD) in the 
right wing government in the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
Another discussion has evolved during the last decade on the pros and cons of private faith schools, 
where especially leading members of the Social Democratic party has been critical of their presence 
from the perspective of social and cultural integration (Roth 2006). However, several parties in 
parliament have been more inclined to show tolerance instead of non-tolerance as Sweden has ratified 
well known human rights conventions such as the European Convention that open up the door for 
these kinds of schools. The establishment of private faith schools followed the “free-school” reform in 
Sweden in 1992, when private actors was allowed to arrange education, but has by many been seen as 
an unintended consequence of an reform which first and foremost was intended to open up for new 
educational philosophies, freedom of choice and/or parental-run cooperative schools. Still, the lack of 
conclusive empirical evidence concerning their social and educational effects has also encouraged an 
attitude of tolerance instead of a full blown rejection or a positive endorsement or respect.  
 
“The veil debate” has also figured in public debate, even though the use of the burqa and the niqab has 
not been frequent, and the Liberal party used it as a symbol issue in the election to parliament 2010. 
Religious customs such as the headscarf have received mixed emotions and the overall stance could 
probably be described as tolerance (in comparison to the burqa or the niqab which have attracted a 
more negative stance such as non-tolerance). For instance, in 2003, The National Agency of Education 
allowed for a prohibition of niqab and burqa, on the basis of educational concerns. However, the 
juridical legitimacy of this prohibition has been questioned, with reference to the law against 
discrimination, and no verdict – and precedent - has yet been recorded.  
 
Many political commentators from different political quarters have - in the light of the dramatic 
examples mentioned above – been eager to draw lines between norms that could be seen as central in 
public and private lives (not at least for sustaining a common social identity) and norms that could be 
more negotiable and flexible. The candidates for the first kind of norms have often been - as was 
mentioned before - principles in criminal law and well known basic norms in human rights 
instruments such as the right to life, physical integrity, anti-discrimination principles, the protection of 
the basic interests of the child (“the best for the child”) and freedom of expression (Roth 2005).  
 
This shift has taken place in a more explicit way during the period of the Social democratic 
government in the beginning of the 21
st
 century and it has been even more emphasized during the 
present right wing government (2010). From the current right wing government´s perspective - and 
from the perspective of the previous Social Democratic government - there has not occurred any 
inclination to delineate any special ethnic groups as groups in need of special protection or assistance. 
A general anti-discrimination policy has prevailed where all groups in society should receive the same 
kind of assistance in terms of equal rights and responsibilities. The governments have left the job to 
give more specific assistance to the local municipalities as the problems for various ethnic or national 
groups may differ depending upon the specific context.  
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In Sweden as elsewhere, the significant gulf between theory and practice haunts the political 
philosophy of multiculturalism. A number of studies (for a summary, see Hertzberg 2006) of the 
policy developed in the practice of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) clearly show a tendency to 
assimilatory ambitions. Although a considerable number of those studies are conducted with 
qualitative methods, in a fashion that makes the overall reliability hard to measure, it must be said the 
prevalence of this tendency seems hard to deny. Partly counter to the relativistic or the pluralist core of 
the multiculturalism and the diversity oratory, the practitioners of the welfare state repeatedly express 
– in discourse as well as in practice – a plea for conformity to perceived Swedish norms and standards, 
Hence, there is an attitude of non-tolerance vis-à-vis the norms and customs of minority groups that 
are perceived to be not in tune with the norms of the majority culture.  
 
At least in the cases where they are described as alien with respect to the Swedish legal system and 
prevailing (official) norms in family life such as gender equity and children´s rights. The cultures and 
of non-Swedish groups is – together with the socioeconomic segregation – are understood as a key 
factor explaining unemployment and social problems among migrants (Hertzberg 2003). Conformity 
to the Swedish ways of acting and thinking are held to be a necessary – if not sufficient – condition for 
inclusion to the labour market and other central social arenas. What is striking in the context is the fact 
that these so-called Swedish norms and customs more and more are phrased with the help of a more 
universali human rights vocabulary such as gender equity and respect for non-discrimination  and 
democracy (Roth 2010).  
 
When it comes to positive acceptance or respect it may be true that prevailing attitudes in Swedish 
society could be described through the well-known concept of “boutique multiculturalism” as the 
concept has been used by the American scholar Stanley Fish (1997). The customs, norms or rituals 
that are endorsed in a more full-fledged sense of the term concern phenomenon such as music, cuisine 
and art. This fact also highlights the critical question concerning the thick cultural “character” of the 
Swedish majority institutions and the welfare traditions that were developed during the 20
th
 century – 
especially during the post war period.  
5. Concluding remarks  
The Swedish state formation is relatively old. For a large portion of its history as a political entity, 
Sweden has exemplified cultural diversity in different senses - in terms of cultural contacts as well as 
population structure. Cultural exchanges with other countries have always taken place, and members 
of ethnic groups from other countries have been a constant presence, even though the numbers 
compared to the period after 1945 have been comparatively speaking rather small. From the period of 
the establishment of the centralized Swedish state and until the 19th century, a ”nationalism” with a 
sharp focus upon religion dominated the public discourse, a nationalism which allowed for a rather 
generous form of cultural diversity as long as the people expressed their belonging to the Lutheran 
church.  
 
After the second world war the official form of nationalism and social belonging changed to more 
cultural forms of nationalism that were seen as more acceptable in the light of world politics. The post 
war period of Sweden has been dominated by a cultural-ethnic nationalism in spite of an official 
multicultural ideology – especially during the two last decades of the 20th century. In this national 
narrative the concept of the welfare state and it´s assumed Swedish expression (“folkhemmet”) has 
played an important role. During the first decades following the second world war, the policies 
towards different immigrant and minority groups were in general purely assimilatory and the tolerance 
or respect for various cultural identities and customs were not very widespread. In addition, there was 
no systematic reception policy. For example, there was no planned reception policy when the Jewish 
and Estonian refugees arrived in Sweden after the end of the war.  
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In the middle of the 1970’s, multiculturalism became an important element in the Swedish model of 
welfare-state politics. It established the principles that have guided Sweden’s immigration policy ever 
since: equality, freedom of choice and partnership. It states equality of opportunity in all fields of 
social and economic life, freedom of choice as to the cultural identity the immigrant wants to assume, 
and partnership between immigrants, their associations and the larger society. The proclaimed 
egalitarian and multicultural ideology has legal backing. In most important matters, formal equality 
before the law holds true, as for example equal access to unemployment contributions and a large 
number of other social welfare benefits. 
 
During the mid-1990’s, we witnessed a shift in Swedish multiculturalism policy. Thereafter, the 
political rhetoric in Sweden´s integration and minority politics often contains the words “same rights 
and responsibilities” and “same possibilities”. The ideal of a multicultural Sweden was more and more 
downgraded and the emphasis was instead placed upon notions such as same rights and 
responsibilities and non-discrimination. If affirmative action or special rights for minorities were 
accepted it was only seen as a limited policy in the initial phases for the immigrant groups. This shift 
has taken place in a more explicit way during the period of the Social democratic government in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century and it has been even more emphasized during the present right wing 
government (2010).  
 
During the last three decades, one central challenge regarding cultural diversity has been the gap 
between theory and practice in the multicultural policies. This also applies to Sweden’s ratification of 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages the Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The gap could be seen as practical in the sense 
that the authorities have not been engaged in any substantial measures in, for example, the field of 
education. Critics of the official guidelines both in political and academic circles have been eager to 
emphasize that the traditional assimilation model, which characterized Swedish policy for several 
decades in the post war period is – on the whole - far from dead, and that the cultural diversity which 
has been endorsed officially has been rather limited in nature.  
 
According to some analysts, Sweden has also problems of discrimination both with respect to the 
labour market and with respect to the provision of various important goods and services such as 
housing and educational opportunities. These problems have often gone hand in hand. For example, 
the Romani people have faced both cultural and economic discrimination. In the case of the organized 
members of the indigenous population - the Saamis - one of their central ways of living - the reindeer 
enterprise - also clashes with the economic activities of the majority population in Northern Sweden, 
and the property rights institution of the modern market economy.  
 
The critical question concerning how tolerance (and recognition) as a norm, public policy and 
everyday practice is conceived in Sweden needs to be formulated in more concrete terms, i.e.,from the 
perspective of whom and concerning which groups or individuals, in what areas. As an introductory 
remark, it is worth mentioning that public policy in Sweden – during the post-war era - has been 
focused on the individual member of various groups, mainly focussing on individual rather than 
collective rights. As stated above, Sweden refusal to ratify the ILO convention on land rights for 
indigenous people could be seen as an illustrative example of this stance.  
 
As a concept in official discourse, tolerance is - for example - among the core values in the national 
curriculum of 1994 for primary and secondary education (a curriculum that will be changed in the year 
of 2011). In addition to values such as democracy, generosity, gender equity tolerance is here seen as a 
cornerstone in the civic education of the public school system. However, it is fair to say that the 
concept of tolerance has not received so much public attention and endorsement in the general public 
debate in recent years (Roth 2010). Concept such as acceptance and respect are seen as more in tune 
with ideas of multiculturalism and integration as they mainly have been expressed by left-wing parties 
in parliament (Roth 1999).  
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Advocates of a multicultural society often express that multiculturalism in various forms are seen as a 
positive asset for all citizens – and – integration is also seen as a two way process which also include 
the majority population. During the last 15 years, though, advocates of multiculturalism – or similar 
political ideas – ha tended to advocate the value of a multiethnic or multicultural society. The notion 
of “mångfald” (diversity) has, to a considerably larger extent been a catch-word in policy and public 
debate, thereby rather focussing on economical values and other positive effects, but not so much on 
the moral virtues of tolerance and respect. The language of economics has gained priority over the 
language of ethics and human rights in many debates on migration and the multiethnic condition, 
especially in policies aimed at integrating migrants in different spheres in Swedish society.
2
  
 
From the perspective of anti-discrimination law and officially endorsed human rights principles, 
intolerance is shown towards cultural traits and norms that are seen as violations of basic rights such 
as the respect for human dignity, physical integrity and life. As was mentioned above, honory killings 
and violence are seen as non-tolerable practices as well as practices that violate gender equity or 
practices that express homophobic attitudes. In certain areas the practices and rituals may be contested 
in the sense that there are advocates for but also critics that completely reject the practices.  
 
The case of halal and kosher meat is another representative example. Here one finds fierce criticism 
from animal rights activists as well as positive acceptance from those political circles that strive to 
extend the content and the scope of the principle of freedom of religion (Roth 2010). Other religious 
customs such as dress codes receive mixed attitudes depending upon their characteristics. Thus, the 
perceived intolerance of migrant groups has been as much discussed as the perceived tolerance of the 
majority towards the minority (if not more, from time to time). As was mentioned above the 
occurrences of burqa and niqab often receive heavy criticism in the public debate. Obviously, the 
questions of tolerance and recognition of the practices of religious and cultural minorities has changed 
depending upon which values are emphasized. As in the example of burqa and niqab, tolerance and 
recognition of claims from religious minorities – in this case, Muslims – has repeatedly been turned 
down in various political settings with reference to universal human rights.   
 
Some scholars claim that the strategy of the majority to employ universal rights in order to restrict the 
minorities’ freedom of religion, and deny the enactment of cultural practices, is a way of enforcing 
assimilation rather than a pluralistic integration (Billig 1992), not least when concept of human rights 
is couched in a nationalistic idiom. Tolerance can also be, according to Brown (Brown 2006), 
comprehended in terms of power and as a productive force – a force that fashions, regulates and 
positions subjects, citizens and states as well as one that legitimates certain kinds of action. The 
history of Swedish multiculturalism shows how different political traditions inevitably shape – and 
even obstruct - the implementation of tolerance and recognition, even when there may be benevolence 
behind the scheme. The complexity at hand calls for a close attention to the national as well as the 
local contexts, where the religious practices in question, for instance the wearing of burqa or niqab, 
become an issue. 
 
  
 
                                                     
2
 However, this conclusion might not hold, when it comes to the public discourse on national minorities, such as the Sami, 
the Tornedal and Swedish Finns, the Roma and the Jewish group;  in this case is presumably more often focused on 
rights, such as those inscribed in the European Framework Concention from the European Council (Roth 2010).  
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